Editor's note
(volume 2, issue 2)
As CEJISS releases its fourth issue, international relations rests uncomfortably on the brink. The international atmosphere resembles a mixture of pre-WWI over-confidence among the great powers (particularly the US, Russia and China) and post-WWI global economic instability. The result of these dangerous ingredients is uncertain, though there is much to consider, especially as recent events seem to signal the return of the political over the economic.
Despite current headlines indicating economic collapse – which is increasingly becoming a reality – the international political dynamics at play deserve attention. At present there is a movement in the US, and to a lesser extent the EU, to ‘bail-out’ or nationalise faltering financial corporations. This may appear as a standard economic question – whether a state should bankroll a national company whose collapse could undermine the economic and wellbeing of its citizens. However, the decision has more to do with politics than economics, particularly in the case of the US, which prides itself as a prototype of Smith’s invisible hand theory that limits a government’s intervention in the economy. The actions of the US signal the beginning of the end of free-market systems in practise, implying that the political structures which encourage and maintain free-market systems are also eroding.
This is likely to have wide-reaching implications to US domestic politics and, by extension, its role in international affairs. If the US can no longer cope with unrestrained market forces, then its ability to ‘sell’ the liberal-economic model abroad is greatly hampered. This is coupled with the fact that as more than $ 1 trilion (USD) of tax paying money was allocated to some of the US’s largest corporations, US citizens rightly ask the question of why they are not more adequately cared for with for example, health care. This question was partially answered by the election of Barak Obama to President of the US in November 2008.
Conceivably, the US under Obama will be more introspective; indicating a return, of sorts, to a form of isolationism whereby the US deploys ad hoc alliances on a case-by-case basis to secure its material interests while reducing its more enduring international commitments. While this policy approach may be logical given the credibility deficit currently plaguing the US, it could not come at a worse time for the EU, which relies heavily on the US for its security. Together the economic crisis and the failing credibility of the US on the international level underscores an essential tension in transatlantic relations, one that has not been lost on the EU’s greatest geopolitical challenge, Russia.
Of the many political crises and conflicts in current international affairs, few will have longer implications for the security of the EU than the August conflict between Georgia and Russia. That conflict, it seems, had less to do with dissuading the Georgians from asserting their sovereignty in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and more to do with limiting Western influence, particularly the EU’s and NATO’s, in the post-Soviet space. If the target audience of the August conflict was the EU and NATO, what were the messages Russia sought to convey?
Russia is signalling its return to great power politics. It demonstrated, through its actions, that there are new costs for Western states and institutions to bear in mind when considering relations in the post-Soviet/post-Czarist states of the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and even the Baltic Sea areas. In practical terms Russia is reasserting itself in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. These states have, at one time or another, since their independence, flirted with the EU; attempting to initiate favoured nation status to gain access to the lucrative EU market-place.
With time however, most of the states in the post-Soviet sphere have selected – for practical reasons associated to growing Russian power – a return to alignment with Russia rather than the EU. The only exceptions are the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia which are now full-fledged members of the EU and NATO, a fact that has limited, though not eradicated Russian influence in that region. Indeed, at every opportunity, Russia exploits EU vulnerabilities and, using its energy leverage, attempts to ‘blackmail’ concessions. Russia’s conflict with Georgia must be viewed as a direct challenge to EU security. This stems from the self-perception of the Union (together with the US) as a defender of democratic states, no matter their size or distance. Georgia is a democratic state which had been engaged in negotiations for NATO membership.
This would have brought NATO to the unstable South Caucuses and provided a forward defence platform for the EU. However, seeing the reluctance of many EU members to bear responsibility for souring EU-Russian relations by including Georgia (and Ukraine) in NATO, Russia acted to undermine Georgian independence and increase its regional and international isolation. After all, the EU is unlikely to support Georgia’s NATO candidacy if conflict could erupt there again – forcing NATO to enact its Article 5 for collective defence – a situation the EU is desperate to avoid as it is ill-prepared in military planning and lacks political will. Russia exploited the divergence of opinion in the EU and struck a blow to NATO and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which is designed to consolidate EU security assets and defend shared interests including the newly democratic states in the Caspian region.
Russia’s actions have caused many in the EU to consider indefinitely postponing further NATO expansion, and to reconsider their relationships in the post-Soviet space. The inability of the EU and NATO to defend embattled democratic states will resonate in international relations for years to come. The EU’s international perception suffered a major setback as a result of the wanton Russian invasion of Georgia and the EU’s hollow promises of retribution. Also, as the leader of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and joint leader (with China) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Russia is establishing new alliances in the post-Soviet space. These alliances have explicitly recognised NATO as a regional challenge rather than a strategic partner, despite sharing information and allowing NATO forces to use Central Asian airspace and land routes to re-supply its soldiers in neighbouring Afghanistan. In constructing a viable alternative to NATO for the post-Soviet states, Russia is effectively initiating a new ‘great game’ in the region.
This ‘great game’ primarily concerns the control of increasingly important and finite energy resources of which the EU relies on for up to 65% of its energy needs. If Russia is able to fully consolidate its position in the post-Soviet space and continues to court Iran, Nigeria and Venezuela (among other energy producers), then the EU’s energy security will be greatly imperilled. As a result of the likely retreat of the US from full engagement in international relations and the re-emergence of Russia as a great geopolitical actor, the EU is coming under immense political and economic pressure. EU decision makers are at loggerheads over the most sensible policies to pursue. In the meantime international realities continue to change. What is needed is a comprehensive EU-level foreign policy makeover that will prevent Russia’s geopolitical dominance of the EU eastern neighbourhood to demonstrate the EU’s strategic influence in shaping its security boundaries and interests.
This may be achieved through the adoption of the following 4 point approach:
1) Immediately extend NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. While this is certain to raise the ire of the Russians, it is unlikely that Russia will risk confrontation with NATO to counter their accession. On the other hand, such a bold initiative is in sync with the EU’s and NATO’s strategic culture of defending democracies and its interests in balancing against rising Russian power in the post-Soviet space.
2) Quicken the pace of Turkish accession to the EU to ensure Turkish commitments to North Mediterranean security and prevent it shifting its foreign policy priorities to accommodate Russia. Also, by including Turkey, the EU will send a positive message to the Islamic states in the post-Soviet space that the EU is not a ‘Christian club’ but rather open to all religious denominations. This will give a much needed boost to the Turkic movement that emerged in 1994 but has yet to bear fruit; a movement that will further constrict Russia’s ability to monopolise influence in Central Asia.
3) Use Turkey as a stepping-stone to establish a new alliance network in the post-Soviet space and Middle East that would include: Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. These states are so-called ‘defensive democracies’ which need the support of the EU to consolidate their democratic institutions and mature as responsible actors. Such an alliance initiative will help advance the EU value system while further balancing against Russia and its Iranian ally.
4) Identifying and securing none-Russian sources of energy supplies to reduce vulnerabilities to EU energy security. Such a policy should include alternative suppliers of energy (such as Azerbaijan, Brazil and Canada) and alternative sources of energy (such as biomass conversion, wind power, tidal and hydro-electricity) with the aim of increasing the EU’s energy autarky and limit its pressure points from exogenous states.
The above serve only as examples of some ways the EU could reduce its vulnerabilities and increase its international clout. These are by no means without their share of risk, though it is time for the EU to adopt a more comprehensive foreign policy where its interests are advanced so its values may be adequately defended. While the above commentary highlighted some pressing issues in international and European relations, the contents of CEJISS 2:2 provide more in-depth research into these and other related themes.
Firstly, Miroslava Filipovic presents an analysis of global capital markets, which provides important insights into the deteriorating global economic situation. Filipovic’s contribution makes the crucial link between economics and politics and seeks to demonstrate how the global capital market functions and why it has recently been unravelling.
The second article by David Erkomaishvili deals with alliance formation in the post-Soviet space. Erkomaishvili’s research, while providing the historical context which gave rise to relations in the post-Soviet space, is mostly centred on current events – 2008 – in the region. This includes developments in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (SCTO) in the wake of the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict.
Thirdly, Liyan Hu and Ter-Shing Cheng introduce developments in Chinese regional policies towards the Central Asian states in the post-Soviet space. This account provides useful insights into the security concerns facing China and the policies it has developed to deal with its economic and political rise to great power status. This contribution also reveals the competition for influence currently underway in Central Asia, and assesses the various actors involved there. This is an essential read for those interested in understanding China’s view of its Western neighbours and its increasingly important role in Central Asian politics.
The fourth contribution, by Sarka Matejkova, stands out for its theoretical treatment of humanitarian intervention and modes of international legitimation in a post-Cold War context. Matejková’s research also provides a solid account of the Just War Theory (JWT) to highlight the conditions which need to be met in order for humanitarian interventions to reinforce the values they claim rather than the interests of their perpetrators.
The fifth contribution by Radio Free Europe correspondent Abubakar Siddique, concerns recent events in Pakistan. It provides an in-depth analysis of the monumental changes underway in this South Asian state and clarifies some of the misunderstandings of Pakistani society in the West.
Finally, Mohammed Obidallah looks at an underwritten aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the control of key water resources. Obidallah deploys an internationallegal argument to demonstrate the overuse of shared water resources by Israel as a sticking point in any potential final settlement of the conflict.
In addition to the research articles, CEJISS 2:2 also contains two comment and analysis articles – one dealing specifically with the Georgian-Russian conflict and the other providing a historic account of the communist regime’s treatment of Catholics in Czechoslovakia – and three book reviews. I hope that you enjoy the contents of CEJISS 2:2 and look forward to your comments and suggestions.
Mitchell A. Belfer
Editor in Chief
Central European Journal of International and Security Studies
