Editor's note
(volume 1, issue 2)
In readying the content of Volume 1 Issue 2 of CEJISS, I was struck by the growing support this journal has received within many scholarly and professional quarters. Building on the success of the first issue, CEJISS has managed to extend its readership to the universities and institutions of a number of countries both in the EU and internationally. It is truly a pleasure to watch this project take on a life of its own and provide its readers with cutting-edge analysis of current political affairs. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our readers for their constructive criticism, comments and continued support.
Much has changed in the 6 months since CEJISS was first launched. I would like to introduce this issue with a brief commentary regarding the tense atmosphere currently clouding Israeli-Syrian relations. There is growing concern of clandestine, actual or potential WMD procurement in the greater Middle Eastern region, which has (rightly) attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers.
On 6 September 2007, it was reported that Israeli air force jets violated Syrian airspace, and after being engaged by Syrian anti-aircraft batteries were forced back to more friendly skies. Since the initial reports were made public, it has become clear that Israel’s actions were not accidental but rather part of a deliberate strategy to deal with potential Syrian nuclear weapons (or materials) acquisition, purportedly from North Korea. Two important issues have been raised: firstly, the continued dangers of WMD proliferation in the Middle East and, possible ways of countering such proliferation. While Israel’s nuclear programmes have been the subject of much debate – especially as Israel refuses to allow IAEA inspectors to assess its nuclear sites and capabilities – the fact remains that Israel is a (largely) responsible state in which there are many checks and balances to prevent the deployment of WMD in a wanton manner. Unfortunately, in most other Middle Eastern states such checks and balances are absent. This compounds the problem of WMD development as regimes which control internal and external security policy without significant oversight are likely to utilise WMD (particularly nuclear weapons) as a strategically deployable weapon instead of adopting (as most other nuclear states have) a strategic view of WMD as residual; not a security mantle-piece.
If the accusations levelled against Syria – regarding its acquisition of nuclear weapons (or material) from North Korea – are accurate, then it confirms the worst fears of Israeli (and international) security analysts: that despite intense international pressures and investigations which attempt to dissuade WMD development and smuggling, such weapons may be acquired with relative ease.
Israel’s military reaction to the Syria acquisition was a necessary and even encouraging response. It demonstrated a willingness to unilaterally respond to a nuclear provocation with maturity. It targeted non-civilian sites and focused its attention only on the source of danger. The deployment of special ground forces which directed Israeli warplanes to their target was dangerous though demonstrated that when intelligence is accurate there is no need to shoulder a burden of military occupation: WMD can be removed with prudent and measured military deployments. Israel’s actions may have many in the US questioning the Bush Administration’s true motives for Operation Iraqi Freedom, as suspected sites may have been neutralised without decapitating Iraq’s leadership which has led to one humanitarian crisis after another. This is not to suggest that Israel’s actions conform to international law, for in fact they violated many international laws and protocols. Additionally, unilateralism is dangerous and should not become a standard in international interactions. However, when faced with an identifiable, clear-and-present and substantial threat, there may be no other reasonable action besides the physical deployment of force. Such deployments must however be selective. They must never target civilian (or dual use) facilities or expand to include targets of opportunity.
The Israeli action will undoubtedly have long-term regional and international security implications and may (hopefully) signal to other states seeking WMD that there are important costs to consider when contemplating developing or acquiring (through other means) such weapons. While international organisations should continue to play a central role in preventing WMD proliferation, until such organisations retain the physical means to compel the abandonment of illicit weapons programmes, it is up to the members of international society to use soft power when possible and hard power when needed to curtail WMD proliferation.
While Israeli-Syrian relations are not further explored in this issue (though contributions on this subject are welcome for future issues), it does contain some interesting and important articles related to international relations and security. Thanks to the cooperation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, CEJISS has the opportunity to republish a special report detailing Iraqi Insurgent media. This report will prove very useful for those interested in the situation in Iraq and its international dynamics. Additionally, this issue contains articles related to security sector reform, humanitarian arms control, the role of diasporas in the formation of foreign policies, changes to Israeli security and a philosophical account of political/religious martyrdom. I sincerely hope that you enjoy this issue and look forward to your comments.
Yours truly,
Mitchell A. Belfer
Editor in Chief
Central European Journal of International & Security Studies
