Iran’s Hormuz Gambit

by Mitchell A. Belfer

Iran’s December (2011) naval exercises and brash rhetoric (Admiral Habibollah Sayyari’s remarked that closing the Strait of Hormuz ‘will be easier than drinking a glass of water’) in response to new sanctions against Iran’s hydrocarbon exports, has brought policy-makers clamouring around ‘crisis tables,’ drafting contingencies as though Iranian intransigence was novel. Such fanfare for a skirmish likely to be brief and leave Iran’s image of military prowess sinking to the seabed, only artificially emboldens its’ leadership.

For Iran to close the Strait it would have to physically intercept, board, seize and occasionally sink vessels; it could lay naval mine-fields or deploy onshore artillery to target traversing ships. None of these options are credible. Iran’s half-dilapidated navy operates out of three ports of limited capacity – Assaluyeh, Bandar Abbas, and Bandar-e Eman Khomeyni – and follows a rigid ‘patrol-centric’ strategy and if it were to close Hormuz, the seizure and/or sinking of merchant vessels and abduction of crews’, in contradiction of international maritime law, would alienate Iran’s allies, leaving it more vulnerable than before. With the US 5th Fleet stationed in Bahrain, the UK’s navy en route and neighbouring states readying their forces, Iran has no hope of closing the sea-lane for any prolonged period.

With such a military imbalance Iran’s pressure-cooking is puzzling. To grasp it, conjecture is required since several competing explanations combine to amplify Iran’s political obstinacy.

First, Iran probably misperceives US redeployments out of Iraq and planned evacuation of Afghanistan and Obama’s decisions to reduce US military spending and focus on Asia Pacific as regional ‘retreat.’ Since Iran applauds itself as the most intractable of US regional rivals, its leadership likely believes that it impels US priority shifts. This is reflected in recent spin when the Iranian navy ‘chased’ a US carrier out of the Gulf. The metaphor is clear; Iran is chasing the US out of the region.

Second, momentum for Iran to end clandestine nuclear activities is gaining pace and Tehran may be exploring ways to raise the stakes, polarise the international community and leave only the usual suspects – the US, UK, and possibly Israel – to intervene, resulting in renewed conspiratorial narratives ‘proving a Christian-Zionist plot’ to enslave Islam. Despite the absurdity of such claims, Iran would find an army of would-be martyrs queuing-up to support its ‘anti-infidel’ counter-crusade.

Third, despite efforts to capitalise on Arab revolutions, Iran’s regional legitimacy has been steadily declining. With the exception of some Shiite revivalist movements, such as those found in Bahrain, the majority of demonstrators reject proliferating Islamic republics. Such regional marginalisation may be prodding Tehran to act seek alternative ways of re-entering regional politics bolstered and politically reinforced after standing down the US.

Finally, Iran’s leadership may be diagnosed with intrepid-lunacy, bravely – but crazily – welcoming national and individual martyrdom for elusive ideological objectives. In this case every Iranian to perish would be considered a hero, every building flattened a holy-site and the art of survival based on divine intervention. Iran may actually set itself on the road to combat with the US; it may sacrifice its young men and economic prosperity simply to satisfy ideological lusts.

Such contrasting explanations do not excuse Iran’s dragging of the region into sustained tensions and hostilities and the international community cannot sit idly by as it does. Neither can it rely on the US to unilaterally deal with Iran. For far too long buck-passing has characterised the international community’s approach to Iran; few are willing to assume responsibility. However, the costs of lethargy are immense since closing the Strait threatens international trade at a time when the global economy is faltering. Additionally, difficult decisions to confront Iran will be rendered impossible if Iran develops nuclear weapons. Rather than awaiting the logic of nuclear deterrence to settle-in, concerted efforts need to be embarked on to prevent the closure of Hormuz.

This entails a three-pronged anchoring-strategy of increasing and adhering to the sanctions regime, commencing multinational naval patrols to keep the Strait open and protect all merchant vessels – with orders to deploy limited military force if Iran moves towards closure – and opening channels of appropriate dialogue so Iran can return to the negotiating table to overcome its self-inflicted obstructions.

Despite Iranian swaggering, any naval exchange with the US or a coalition of states would devastate Iran’s navy in much the same way as Operation Praying Mantis did in 1988. This would reflect military impotence and humble Iran in the eyes of many within the country and beyond, possibly producing a resurgence of internal political dissent, suppressed in 2009, since the vanguard defenders of the Islamic Republic, the Revolutionary Guards, would have been dealt a glaring, crippling defeat.

Such internal tremors would ripple throughout the region. Just as Hamas has quietly distanced itself from Damascus in the face of Syria’s civil war, it is likely that Hezbollah would reduce its relationship to Iran and seek more political means of resistance. Estranging Iran from Hezbollah could assist in bringing the intra-Lebanese, Lebanese-Israeli and intra-Bahraini conflicts to negotiated settlement and usher in a new period of wider Middle Eastern politics.

While it is true that ‘no battle plan survives contact with the enemy’ and that armed force should remain a tool of last resort, the international community must not shy away from seizing the opportunity to stabilise the wider Middle East. Iranian intransigence, and steps towards confrontation, provides a legitimate path to reconstruct a dysfunctional region. Instead of deploying energies to diplomatically preventing Iran’s closure of the Strait, perhaps it is time to let history take its course, so that Iran’s delusional dreams of regional hegemony can make their way to the bottom of the unforgiving sea.

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