Cejiss

Recent legislative elections have stirred Russian civil society to actively protest the Kremlin. Russian decision-makers cannot ignore the increased tremors and will have to adjust their policies to better reflect socio-political expectations and Russia will either experience a hardening that will bring a USSR-like regime or induce effective participation in political processes. A ‘colour revolution’ as seen in Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia may yet occur leading to the conclusion that only one option exists: political competition and participation.

United Russia controls most of the country’s levers of power and Putin is the personality behind the Party. On 23 September 2011, Putin announced his intention to return to office as President and made it clear that he would be elected while Medvedev would inherit his prime ministerial chair. If (or rather when) Putin wins the next elections, it is likely that he will remain in power until 2024 (two 6-year terms). Taken together with his previous mandates as President and Prime Minister, equates to a 24-year tour-of-duty: only Stalin retained power longer. Since Putin’s 2000 election, a tacit agreement linked his government and the population: empowerment in exchange for stability. However, suddenly, the masquerade of Medvedev’s presidency was exposed – Putin was truly in power. Moscow’s newspapers denounced the ‘Brezhnevization’, Philippe Thureau-Dangin in Courrier International n° 1100 recalls: the regime avoids change.

During 2007’s legislative elections, United Russia earned 64% of the vote, it dropped to 50% in December 2011 and several irregularities were reported by the OSCE as well as informed citizens (i.e. Alexei Navalny). Those results reveal Putin’s double strategy: firstly, to reflect public discontent in order to avoid protests while still retaining a majority in the Duma (238 of the total 450 seats). Secondly, to increase his legitimacy against Medvedev who – as head of the lists and incumbent President – appears responsible for this drawback. The strategy did not work and Putin is closely associated to both United Russia and its discomfiture. Indeed, according to France Culture (02/2011), an entire third of polled Russians recognise United Russia as “the party of swindlers and thieves”.

There have been two political directions, contradictory yet complementary. The government opened Russia more and allowed its citizens to exit the country more easily while increasing its pressure over the media and opposition groups and individuals (i.e. Khodorkovski). Thus, Russian society has changed and people are less keen on closing their eyes to power consolidation simply for the sake of stability. The regime is unsustainable because it induces pressures that may eventually cause an implosion – the protests in Moscow seem to be the forerunner. Reflections bring out three fictional scenarios.

Scenario 1: USSR-like Russia

This paragraph aims to figure out what would happen if Putin gets re-elected in 2012 and chooses to strengthen his control over Russia.

Russia orientates towards a new USSR based on trade. This Russia resembles the USSR in many ways: opponent oppression, single-state party (United Russia), cult of personality (Putin) and opposition to the US. The current protests vanish and Putin, aware how close he was to being ejected from power, hardens his control over Russia. Indeed, during the 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia redesigned the country’s borders unilaterally. For the first time since 1991, the post-Soviet spaces’ status quo was breached. Similarly, Russia is adopting a conflict-laden position towards the US. In 2010, Medvedev qualified NATO’s expansion as a “national threat” and launched military measures to strengthen its western borders.

Likewise, Russia rebuilds its “lost empire” through the Eurasian Union. Putin announced in October 2011 his will to build a European Union-like economic integration to be established in 2015. Members together with candidate and eligible countries form the USSR borders – with some exceptions.

Thus, in this scenario, the government increases this strategy of conflict and influence. Putin holds on to power and is meant to stay in office until 2024 – coming at the expense of civil society – and political pluralism is prohibited. The European Union (EU) erodes due to the 2011 debt crisis and China economically outpaces the United States as the Eurasian Union prevails over the EU and the new apex of world trade focuses on Asia. Yet the real giant is China, Russia faces an intense demographic deficit, the population’s wealth decreases and powerful elite holds on most of the state’s money. If stability prevails in general, more conflicts are likely to ensue between Russia and its neighbours with unpredictable consequences.

Implications

In such an authoritarian Russia, investors would flee the country causing major economic disturbances. Yet, the country would manage not to fall into long-term recession thanks to its natural resources, the Eurasian Union and its ties with China. Regarding security, the EU would lose its eastern buffer with Russia making the region more dangerous. Relations with the US would be openly inimical. Yet, as Russia’s strategy would be based on trade, not on ideology, a war would be unlikely to happen.

Scenario 2: Putin the Reformer

This paragraph aims to figure out what would happen if Putin gets re-elected in 2012 and chooses to grant society the freedoms it call for.
Putin needs to take some steps towards democracy in order to avoid revolution. This path can be inferred from the steps he announced in order to make the vote more transparent. Putin is re-elected in 2012, nevertheless only during the second round. Protests start again due to evidence of irregularities and the contestation spreads throughout the society. Putin, unwilling to leave power, grants Russian society the freedom it called for: effective political competition and participation. No revolution happens and Russia is on its way towards the rule of law. Nevertheless, Putin cannot remain in power while granting society more freedoms and the next election brings defeat to Putin and his government – the winner is a liberal from the new generation of politicians.

In this scenario, the population’s wealth increases as investors do not fear for their investments. The country is upgraded to democracy, becomes dynamic and diversifies its economy towards services. In diversifying, democratic Russia is able to overcome the peak oil issue.

Implications

Russia would become a real democracy, thus its population would enjoy more freedom. Economically, the country would be wealthier than before and its economy diversified thus, potentially resilient. Lastly, being democratic and rather “wealthy”, Russia would no longer represent a regional security challenge.

Scenario 3: Aborted revolution

This paragraph aims to figure out what would happen if a ‘colour revolution’ ejected Putin from power in 2012.
Putin does not manage to overcome the opposition and neither does he comply with societal expectations nor harden his control over society. As a result, the system implodes with unprecedented protests turning Putin’s re-election into a ‘colour revolution’. The opposition groups gather and choose a leader. Under national and international pressures, Putin agrees to declaring the election results null and void and on returning to the polls. The winner is the newly formed opposition coalition and Putin is ejected from power.

The first post-Putin years resemble the second scenario. Yet, the revolution fails. Russia, fighting with its internal problems (i.e demographic deficit, increasing xenophobia and nationalism) orientates towards nationalist parties. This far right, already popular in 2012, spreads across society and comes to power. Russia becomes autarkic and violent ethnical conflicts further divide society.

Implications

Security threat would be high, the regime’s xenophobia making it irrational and unpredictable. Caucasus would be in the front lines (especially Chechnya) with possible ethnic cleansing and a Kosovo-Serbia-like outcome. Economically, the Eurasian Union would be left aside as Russia would focus on its Slavic partners bringing the country in a long-term recession.

* * *

The second option is highly recommended, as it is the most sustainable. A colour revolution scenario it is too uncertain, potentially unstable thus subject to fail. In reformed Russia, society fights for effective political participation and obtains it.

The implementation of such a policy would be mainly through the introduction of political competition. Along with this competition would come several reforms (freedom of speech, political participation). Economically, Russia must diversify in order to avoid the future oil and gas crises and increase the share of services in its economy. Putin has the chance to reform Russia for the better: he must grab it!